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NOTES

ToRTs-STnicT LIABiLn-Plaintiff, an employee of the Ministry

of Supply, was injured by an explosion while performing her duties
as an inspector in an ordnance plant operated by the defendant.
Negligence was neither alleged nor proved. The trial court found
that the manufacture of munitions was a non-natural use of land,'
that it was an ultra-hazardous activity, and held the defendant
strictly liable.2 The court of appeal' held that there could be no
recovery on the basis of strict liability as "escape from the premises"
is an essential part of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.! The decision
was affirmed by the House of Lords which further intimated that
Rylands v. Fletcher could never serve as the basis of recovery for
personal injuries.' Read v. 1. Lyons and Company Ltd. [1946] 2
All England Rep. 471.
This English case is of interest because it denies the development, from the case of Rylands v.,Fletcher, of any general principle
of absolute liability for an ultra-hazardous activity.6 Originally that
famous case imposed liability in absence of negligence, on an
occupier of land who, in the non-natural' use of such land, allowed
the escape of a substance likely to do mischief onto the land of
another, and there causing damage to his property.
In the instant case, the plaintiff relied on the American Restatement of the Law of Torts as expressive of the English Law. Although in America, Rylands v. Fletcher has been rejected by name
1. The trial court relied on Rainham Chemicals Work Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish
and Guano Co., Ltd. [1921] 2 A. C. 465. On appeal to the House of Lords,
Viscount Simon thought the House would not be bound by this case to hold that
the manufacture of munitions in time of war was a "non-natural" use of land.
2. Read v. Lyons and Co., Ltd. [1944] 2 All E. R. 98.
3. Read v. Lyons and Co., Ltd. [19451 1 K. B. 216, [1945] 1 All E. R. 106.
4. [1866] L, R. 1 Ex. 265, 279. Blackburn J., stated the rule:
"We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape."
This rule was approved by the House of Lords [1868] L. R. 8 H. L. 880, 840,
with the addition of the words "natural and non-natural use of land" by Lord
Cairns.
5. [1946] 2 All E. R. 471, 476.
6. Fault is requisite in Louisiana. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870. "Every
act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair it. . .. " But see Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La.
942, 20 So. (2d) 273 (1944), noted In (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAw Raviw 601.
7. "Non-natural use" is generally understood to be an activity not sanctioned
by general usage. Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of
Land (1929) 8 Cambridge L. J. 876.
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in most jurisdictions,' the development of the doctrine is reflected
in Section 519 of the Restatement:
"One who carries on an ultra-hazardous activity is liable to
another whose person, land, or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriageof
the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes
the activity ultra-hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." (Italics supplied.)
Note the phrase "miscarriage of the activity" rather than any
phrase conveying the idea of escape of a substance from the premises.
Note also that Section 519 specifically includes the person as one of
the interests protected.
Although the English courts have never expressly applied a
principle of law as broad as that contended for by the plaintiff and
enunciated by the Restatement, they have extended the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher beyond its original bounds
In the case of
Charing Cross Electric Supply Company v. Hydraulic Power Company,"° recovery was permitted to a plaintiff who occupied only
under a license and not under any right of property in the soil.'
Recovery has also been permitted for damage due to vibrations
rather than to the escape of some tangible substance."
Rylands v. Fletcher was the basis of recovery for personal
injuries in the case of Hale v. Jennings Brothers."
8. Prosser, A Handbook on the Law of Torts (1941) 452; Smith, Tort and
Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification, Part III (1917) 80
Harv. L. Rev. 409, 418. Fpr a history of the application of the rule in Ryland#
v. Fletcher by American courts see Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926)
416.
9. Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 8, at 410: "In the later English cases the application of the rule. in Rylando v. Pletcher is not limited to cases of Injury resulting
from 'use by a person of land belonging to him ...
'"
See rule of Ryland" v.
Fletcher as stated Id. at 414.
10. [1914] 8 K. B. 772. Electric cables under a public street were injured
by the bursting of a water main under the same street. See also Batcheller v.
Tunbridge Wells Gas Company [1901] 84 L. T. 765; West v. Bristol Tramway
Company (1908] 2 K. B. 14.
11. Strong dictum to effect that Rylands v. Fletcher would allow recovery
for damage to a business interest. Discharge of electrical current into. the ground
interfered with telephone communications. Recovery was denied because defendant was acting under an order of the Board of Trade. National Telephone Company v. Baker [1898] 2 Ch. D. 186.
12. Hoare and Company v. McAlpine [1923] 1 Ch. 167 (vibrations from the
driving of piling damaged hotel).
18. [19381 1 All E. R. 579, decided by the court of appeal. Plaintiff, owner
of an amusement park concession, was injured when a chair became detached
from a Chair-O-Plane operated by the defendant.
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Moulton, L. J., in the case of Wing v. General Omnibus Company, 4 gives a broad scope to the rule:
"This cause of action is of the type usually described by reference
to the well-known case of Rylands v. Fletcher. For the purposes
of to-day it is sufficient to describe this class of action isarising
out of cases where by excessive use of some private right a person
has exposed his neighbor's property or person to danger."' 5
The court, in the case at bar, might easily have followed the
tendency of prior cases and decided that in England an ultrahazardous activity creates absolute liability. It is easy to understand
why such a doctrine was not looked upon with favor in America
during our period of industrial expansion,"6 but more difficult to
determine a reason for the denial at this late date in England. Perhaps it lies in the need for maximum industrial development in
Britain during the war and the postwar period and a corresponding
hesitancy to burden industry.
It is unlikely that the restrictive holding of this case will be
reflected in future American decisions. Rather, the tendency, as
evidenced by workmen's compensation acts and similar legislation,
seems to be toward the position of the Restatement. However, the
tendency to assimilate liability for airplane accidents to the familiar
fault provision that controls in the surface traffic cases' 7 perhaps
suggests that in this country we are not yet prepared to move readily
into the field of absolute liability.
Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity seems to afford an
effective means of allowing a dangerous but socially desirable
activity to function at the price of paying its own way.'1
EDx;A H. LANCASTER, JR.
14. (1909] 2 K. B. 652, 665.
15. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 59 stated that the rule of Rylands
v. Flotcher has developed until the modern English version may be expressed
". .. one who maintains a dangerous thing, or engages in an activity which

involves a high degree of risk of harm to others in spite of all reasonable care,
is strictly liable for the harm which it causes."
16. See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 8, at 868.

17. See, for example, Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, § 6 [9 Uniform

Laws Ann. 17 (1928)] ; Rhyne, Aviation Accident Law (1947)

61, 81, 88.

18. Stallybrass, supra note 7, at 887: "The principle of law behind all these

cases is, it is submitted, that if a man takes a risk, which he ought not to take

without also taking upon his shoulders the consequences of that risk, he shall
pay for any damage that ensues."

